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ROCK v. ARKANSAS: HYPNOTICALLY "REFRESHED"
TESTIMONY OR HYPNOTICALLY
"MANUFACTURED" TESTIMONY?
The Constitution does not expressly grant a criminal defendant
the right to testify on his own behalf, although the United States
Supreme Court recognizes this right as a fundamental element of
due process.' In June 1987, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 vote, de-
cided Rock v. Arkansas.2 This decision expands the scope of a de-
fendant's right to testify on his own behalf.
In Rock, the Court examined the controversial issue of "hypnot-
ically refreshed testimony." 3 The Court held Arkansas's per se rule
excluding a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony
unconstitutional. The Court deemed the restriction "arbitrary" be-
cause hypnotically refreshed testimony may be reliable in an individ-
ual case.
This Note argues that neither the Constitution nor Supreme
Court precedent mandates the Court's conclusion in Rock. Arkan-
sas's rule of exclusion should not be considered "arbitrary," given
the extensive expert and judicial support it enjoys. It therefore
should stand as a legitimate restriction on a defendant's right to of-
fer evidence. Supreme Court due process decisions establish that
the right to present evidence on one's own behalf is not absolute.
Similarly, compulsory process decisions demonstrate that the right
is qualified by other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.
The Rock decision is significant for several reasons. First, it
broadly protects a criminal defendant's right to present evidence in
his favor. This Note argues that this protection exceeds constitu-
tional requirements, in essence permitting the defendant to present
virtually untestable evidence. Current scientific research suggests
that not even experts can assess the reliability of hypnotically re-
1 See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
2 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
3 "Hypnotically refreshed testimony" is a phrase which courts use to describe the
testimony of a witness or defendant who attempts to enhance his recollection through
pretrial hypnosis. Any hypnosis of a witness or defendant is done before trial; there is
no hypnosis in the courtroom. Thereafter, the previously hypnotized witness or defend-
ant testifies as would any witness, seeking to include any new information acquired
through hypnosis.
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freshed testimony in a particular case.4 The trier of fact, however, is
forced to assess testimony labeled hypnotically "refreshed," testi-
mony which may, in fact, be hypnotically "manufactured." Unquali-
fied to make such an assessment, the trier of fact can only speculate
whether the events recalled actually occurred. Secondly, Rock may
signal the demise of the Frye test5 which requires that a scientific
method of producing evidence gain acceptance among the scientific
community before a court may admit evidence it produces. Because
the Frye test may per se exclude reliable evidence in a specific case, it
appears "arbitrary" under Rock. Thirdly, implementation of proce-
dural safeguards, constitutionally permissible under Rock, can not
adequately curb the inherent unreliability which accompanies the
admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. Finally, some
courts, determined to preserve exclusion of hypnotically refreshed




Although hypnosis is an ancient practice, a precise understand-
ing of it continues to elude the scientific community. 6 Initially,
American law completely rejected hypnosis. 7 Following psycholo-
gists' increased use of hypnosis as therapy, some courts permitted
hypnosis as a method of refreshing recall.8 However, as courts
looked to the scientific community for assessment of hypnosis, many
courts excluded hypnotically refreshed testimony.9
4 See infra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
6 No generally accepted definition of hypnosis exists. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d
129, 131 & n.5 (Alaska 1986) (citing Orne, On the Simulating Subject as a Quasi-Control
Group in H)pnosis Research, What, Why, and How, in HYPNosIs: DEVELOPMENTS IN RE-
SEARCH AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 520-21 (E. Fromm & R.E. Shor 2d ed. 1979)). It ap-
pears, however, that hypnosis is suggestive by its very nature. See infra note 94 and
accompanying text. One source defines hypnotism as "[t]he act of inducing artificially a
state of sleep or trance in a subject by means of verbal suggestion by the hypnotist or by
the subject's concentration upon some object." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 668 (5th ed.
1979). Another authority defines hypnosis as a "highly suggestible state into which a
willing subject is induced by a skilled therapist .... State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764,
765 (Minn. 1980) (citation omitted).
Hypnosis theorists are divided into two major factions. One group holds that "hyp-
nosis is a distinctive altered mental state or 'trance' in which a person tends to respond
to suggestions in an uncritical fashion." Contreras, 718 P.2d at 131. The other group
"denies the existence of a special trance state and explains hypnotic behavior as simply a
function of the subject's rapport with the hypnotist, as well as his set of attitudes, reser-
vations and expectations regarding hypnosis." Id.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 12-15.
8 See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 22-24 & 30-37 and accompanying text.
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In the past two decades, courts have struggled with the issue of
whether hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible in a criminal
trial. 10 State and federal courts have used at least four approaches
in deciding the issue. 1
A. Early American Courts Ignore Hypnosis
An American court first considered hypnosis in People v.
Ebanks 12 in 1897. Declaring that "the law of the United States does
not recognize hypnotism,"13 the California Supreme Court refused
to admit testimony by a hypnotist relating exculpatory statements
made by the defendant while hypnotized. 14 Courts almost com-
pletely ignored hypnosis in the decades following Ebanks.15
The revival of hypnosis in forensic use coincided with increased
acceptance of hypnosis as therapy. 16 Today, the legal controversy
over hypnosis focuses on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony. Those opposing hypnotically refreshed testimony urge
its exclusion as a matter of law. They argue using hypnosis to en-
hance memory is inherently unreliable, and thus testimony re-
freshed through hypnosis should be inadmissible. Those who favor
admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony view hypnosis as an ac-
ceptable method of refreshing recall. They believe that the trier of
10 The scope of this Note is limited to use of hypnotically refreshed testimony in
criminal trials.
I 1 See infra notes 18-70 and accompanying text.
12 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
13 Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053.
14 Id. See also Austin v. Barker, 110 A.D. 510, 96 N.Y.S. 814 (1906) (civil case hold-
ing evidence insufficient to sustain plaintiff's verdict where the only evidence amounted
to plaintiff's hypnotically refreshed testimony claiming alleged seduction). But cf. State
v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 609, 50 S.E. 283, 285-86 (1905) (previously hypnotized witness
permitted to testify; fact of hypnosis admissible relative to credibility as a witness).
15 Between 1915 and 1950, only one reported American case considered any aspect
of hypnosis. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence
Suspectable?, 38 OHIO ST. LJ. 567, 579 n.67 (1977). See People v. Bishop, 359 Ill. 112,
115-18, 198 N.E. 238, 239-41 (1934) (where defendant claimed he signed arson confes-
sion involuntarily and testified that he confessed while hypnotized, court held that in-
consistencies between confession and other facts in evidence affect weight of confession
rather than admissibility).
16 The American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association of-
ficially recognized hypnosis as a therapeutic technique in 1958 and 1960 respectively.
M. ORNE, D. SosKis, D. DINGES, E. ORNE, M. TONRY, HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TEsTI-
MONY: ENHANCED MEMORY OR TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE? 29-36 (1985) [hereinafter M.
ORNE]. Dr. Martin T. Orne has thirty-five years of experience in the field of hypnosis,
with special expertise regarding hypnotically refreshed testimony and its use in criminal
trials. Dr. Orne is a Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania, as well as
Director of the Unit for Experimental Psychiatry and Senior Attending Psychiatrist at
The Institute of Pennsylvania Hospital. He serves as a consultant to several government
agencies, including the U.S. Department ofJustice and the National Institute of Mental
Health. Dr. Orne is also Editor-in-Chief of the InternationalJournal of Clinical and Experie-
mental Hypnosis, a position he has held since 1961.
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fact should decide the credibility and reliability of hypnotically in-
duced testimony.1 7
B. Recent Determinations Regarding the Admissibility of
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony
Since 1968, courts addressing whether hypnotically refreshed
testimony is properly admissible at criminal trials have employed at
least four approaches. The first court faced with hypnotically re-
freshed testimony adopted a per se admissible approach. However,
deferring to recognized scientific doubts about the reliability of hyp-
nosis as a memory enhancer, later courts adopted a per se inadmissi-
ble approach. Still other courts developed one of two intermediate
approaches: some jurisdictions permit hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony if the proponent can demonstrate compliance with strict pro-
cedural safeguards, while others reject any hard rules and assess
such testimony on a case-by-case basis.
1. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Per Se Admissible: Hypnosis
Raises Questions of Credibility, But Not Admissibility
A court first considered the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony in Harding v. State '8 in 1968. In Harding, the vic-
tim of a shooting and alleged rape was hypnotized several weeks
after the incident in an attempt to increase her recollection of the
crime. The Harding court admitted the victim's hypnotically re-
freshed testimony with "no difficulty,"' 19 accepting the victim's testi-
mony that she was reciting facts from her own memory. 20 "The fact
that she had told different stories or had achieved her present
knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the question of the
weight of the evidence which the trier of fact .. .must decide." 21
Thus, Harding created a per se admissible approach to hypnotically
refreshed testimony.
However, many subsequent courts rejected the Harding ap-
proach, noting that it "engaged in little or no analysis of the issue,
and merely reiterated the general proposition that the fact of hypno-
17 Id at 37-40.
18 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). Harding
was subsequently overruled by State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983). See
infra note 37 and accompanying text.
19 5 Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
20 Id But see infra notes 163 & 177 discussing expert opinion that a subject cannot
reliably tell what parts of his memory are hypnotically refreshed and what parts were
originally remembered.
21 Harding, 5 Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306. The Harding court apparently con-
sidered hypnosis an acceptable way of refreshing memory, similar to traditional methods
such as having a witness look at notes or memoranda. M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 37.
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sis 'goes to the weight, not the admissibility' of the evidence."' 22 By
the late 1970s, some courts recognized inherent dangers in admit-
ting hypnotically refreshed testimony.3 These courts considered
the Harding approach's "failure to provide an adequate record of the
scientific opinion and consensus on the reliability of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony" among its serious shortcomings. 24
Nevertheless, some recent decisions adhere to a per se admissi-
ble approach similar to the Harding analysis. 25 These courts always
admit hypnotically refreshed testimony; the credibility of testimony
refreshed by hypnosis is a question for the trier of fact. In Beck v.
Norris,26 the Sixth Circuit admitted hypnotically refreshed testimony
by prosecution witnesses, in accordance with Tennessee law.2 7 The
defendant argued that the admission of the witnesses' hypnotically
refreshed testimony deprived him of a fair trial. The court rejected
the defendant's claim because the state employed procedural safe-
guards 28 and a witness not subjected to hypnosis also identified the
defendant. 29
2. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Per Se Inadmissible: The Frye
Test and the Abandonment of Harding
In 1980, declining to follow the Harding approach, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court refused to admit hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony. In State v. Mack,30 the court relied on "the best expert
testimony" indicating that "no expert can determine whether mem-
ory retrieved by hypnosis... is truth, falsehood, or confabulation-
22 People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 36, 723 P.2d 1354, 1364, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
253 (1982) (citations omitted). The courts following the Harding approach "simply
noted that the witness believed he was testifying from his own memory and that his
credibility could presumably be tested by ordinary cross-examination." Id.
23 Id. In 1978, the Ninth Circuit extended Harding's per se admissibility approach to
criminal cases, yet warned against the dangerous potential for abuse and proposed sev-
eral safeguards. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1978).
24 M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 37.
25 See, e.g., State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983) (any contamination of witness'
testimony by hypnosis is a factual issue going to weight not admissibility); United States
v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) ("fact of hypnosis, if disclosed to
jury, may affect the credibility of evidence, not its admissiblity").
26 801 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1986).
27 Id. at 244 (under Tennessee law, hypnosis affects credibility not admissibility).
28 For example, the hypnotic sessions were videotaped, the psychologist-hypnotist
testified as to the procedure followed, and the videotapes of the hypnotic sessions were
shown to the jury. Id. at 244-45. See infra note 61 for a comparison to the Hurd
safeguards.
29 Beck, 801 F.2d at 244-45 (defendant was not deprived of the right of confronta-
tion because he had the opportunity to cross-examine both the hypnotist and the wit-
nesses who had been hypnotized).
30 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
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a filling of gaps with fantasy.13 1 Accordingly, the court concluded
that testimony induced through hypnosis is "not scientifically relia-
ble as accurate."3 2 The landmark decision in Frye v. United StateS33
governed the question of admissibility in Mack. In Frye, the D.C.
Circuit established a test to determine the admissibility of evidence
produced by a scientific method. The Frye test requires that 6xperts
agree that a scientific method of producing evidence elicit scientifi-
cally reliable results before a court may admit such results.3 4 Appli-
cation of the test prevents misleading the jury by "unproven and
ultimately unsound scientific methods. '35
Several states followed the Mack analysis, adopting a per se rule
excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony.36 Even Maryland,
31 Id. at 768. "Confabulation" is a phenomenon that occurs when a hypnotic sub-
ject fills in details from his imagination in order to make his answer more coherent and
complete. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2713 (1987). Particularly troublesome is
that often these false "recollections" are not viewed by the subject as guesses, but in-
stead, as "contextually appropriate and meaningful memories." M. ORNE, supra note 16,
at 19. For example, someone may be trying to remember a person whom he has seen at
a distance of 100 yards. During hypnosis, the subject is asked to look through "binocu-
lars" so he can "look at" that person. The subject may describe the person in detail
even though it is beyond the physical ability of the human eye at 100 yards. Id. at 10.
Other studies where hypnotic subjects describe the year 2000 in detail demonstrate the
ease of inducing fantasy. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 132 (Alaska 1986) (citing
Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'LJ. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL Hyp-
NOsIS 312, 322-23 (1979)). See also Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypno-
sis, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 313, 337 (1980) (age progression experiments readily prove that
detailed recall can be pure confabulation). The need to "fill gaps" is so strong that
when asked a question, the hypnotic subject will only rarely respond "I don't know."
Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768.
32 292 N.W.2d at 768.
33 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court excluded expert testimony con-
cerning the results of an early version of today's polygraph test. Because the court de-
termined that the polygraph had not yet received general scientific acceptance,
testimony regarding polygraph results was inadmissible.
Historically, the Frye test applied to physical tests such as radar, the polygraph and
voiceprints. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536-37, 432 A.2d 86, 91-92 (1981). However,
modern courts have applied the Frye test in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., United States
v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981) (photograph dating by mathematical and
astronomical calculations); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979) (expert
testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification); United States v. Brown, 557
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic analysis of human hair); United States v. Mc-
Daniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (spectrographic voice identification); State v.
Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981) (multi-system polymorphic enzyme
blood analysis).
34 293 F.2d at 1014.
35 People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 723 P.2d 1354, 1379, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
264 (1982).
36 See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, (1982); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388
Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310
N.W.2d 306 (1981), aff'd 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); State v. Palmer, 210
Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523,466 N.Y.S.2d 255,
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which originally permitted such testimony in Harding, reversed its
position. State v. Collins3 7 overruled Harding, holding hypnotically
refreshed testimony inadmissible as a matter of law.
Most courts considering the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony have applied the Frye test or a similar "general
acceptance standard."' 8 In 1986, the Alaska Supreme Court held
hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible because it failed the
Frye standard.39 It characterized the Frye test as "essentially a 'preju-
dice-versus-probative value test,' similar to Evidence Rule 403."40
Admitting evidence produced by an unaccepted scientific
method poses a significant danger of prejudice. Jurors may un-
equivocally accept hypnotically refreshed testimony as accurate and
truthful. 41 However, because the scientific community does not ac-
cept such testimony as reliable,42 it offers little probative value.
Therefore, evidence such as hypnotically refreshed testimony
453 N.E.2d 484 (1983); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170
(1981).
37 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
38 Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 134 (Alaska 1986). See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins
v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 196-99, 644 P.2d 1266, 1282-85 (1982) (Feldman, J.,
Supplemental Opinion); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 33-51, 723 P.2d 1354, 1361-
73, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 262-65 (1982); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673, 676-77 (Ind.
1983); Collins, 296 Md. at 679-81, 464 A.2d at 1033-34; Commonwealth v. Kater, 388
Mass. 519, 525-27, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1195-96 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich.
615, 622-23, 329 N.W.2d 743, 745-48 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 767-69
(Minn. 1986).
Furthermore, nearly every court faced with the contention that the Frye test does
not apply to hypnosis has rejected it. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 134 n. 15. See, e.g., People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 723 P.2d 1354, 1374, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264 (1982) (Frye test
applies to evidence "based upon" or "developed by" new scientific techniques); Polk v.
State, 48 Md. App. 382, 394, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048 (1981) ("The induced recall of the
witness is dependent upon, and cannot be disassociated from, the underlying scientific
method"); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980) (although hypnotically re-
freshed recall not "strictly analogous" to mechanical testing, Frye equally applicable);
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981) ("policy reasons embodied in
[Frye] are germane to hypnotically refreshed testimony as well"); Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 101, 436 A.2d 170, 172 (1981) ("any means by which evidence
is scientifically adduced must satisfy the standard established in Frye .. "). But see
United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1984); State v. Seager, 341
N.W.2d 420, 429 (Iowa 1983); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 149 (N.D. 1983); State
v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 567-68, 329 N.W.2d 386, 393, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946
(1983).
39 Contreras, 718 P.2d at 129.
40 Id. at 135. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
41 See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
42 The Supreme Court acknowledged that "scientific understanding of the phe-
nomenon and of the means to control the effects of hypnosis is still in its infancy." Rock




The courts employing this per se inadmissible approach do not
completely bar the previously hypnotized witness from testifying.
Only the hypnotically refreshed testimony is excluded. These
courts permit a witness to testify about matters recalled and related
to others prior to undergoing hypnosis.44 However, at least one ex-
pert "believe[s] that once a potential witness has been hypnotized
for the purpose of enhancing memory his recollections have been so
contaminated that he is rendered effectively incompetent to tes-
tify .... [and] argues that testimony by previously hypnotized wit-
nesses should never be admitted into evidence." 45
At least two courts have adhered to a per se inadmissible ap-
proach to hypnotically refreshed testimony where the defendant has
no pre-hypnotic memory.46 In Greenfield v. Commonwealth,47 the de-
fendant claimed he had no recollection of the crime's events yet re-
counted those events while hypnotized.48 The Virginia Supreme
Court held the defendant's statements inadmissible, emphasizing
that most experts view hypnotic evidence as unreliable because a
hypnotic subject can "invent false statements" and is "subject to
heightened suggestibility. ' 49 In denying habeas corpus relief to the
same defendant, the district court in Greenfield v. Robinson 50 rejected
defendant's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to tes-
tify solely because hypnotic testimony was his only evidence in de-
fense.5 1 The court stated, "[t]he mere fact that a crime has no
eyewitnesses or direct evidence does not warrant a court to accept
evidence that may be able to tell the trier of fact something about
the crime, but may be of dubious quality."' 52 In State v. Atwood,53 the
defendant, charged with murdering his wife, claimed he had no
memory of the crime and made the same unsuccessful argument as
the defendant in Greenfield.
43 Contreras, 718 P.2d at 135. Under Rule 403, even relevant evidence can be ex-
cluded where the danger of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. See
supra note 40.
44 Other decisions following this approach include State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601
(Del. Super. Ct. 1985) and State v. Moreno 709 P.2d 103 (Hawaii 1985).
45 Diamond, supra note 31, at 314-15.
46 See Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974); State v.
Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (1984).
47 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
48 Id. at 715, 204 S.E.2d at 419.
49 Id.
50 413 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Va. 1976).
51 Id. at 1120-21.
52 Id
53 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (1984).
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3. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Admitted If Proponent Complies
With Procedural Prerequisites Designed to Reduce Risks
Associated with Hypnosis
Some courts admit hypnotically refreshed testimony if the pro-
ponent can demonstrate compliance with strict procedural safe-
guards designed to ensure the testimony's reliability.54 In State v.
Hurd,55 the leading case advancing this approach, the New Jersey
Supreme Court did not require as a precondition of admitting hyp-
notically refreshed testimony, "that hypnosis be generally accepted
as a means of reviving truthful or historically accurate recall." 56 The
Hurd court declared that the purpose of hypnosis "is not to obtain
truth, as [is] a polygraph or 'truth serum' . . . [but] as a means of
overcoming amnesia and restoring the memory of a witness." '57
Given this purpose, the court held that use of hypnosis to refresh
recollection can satisfy the Frye standard "in certain instances."58
The court concluded that where hypnosis is conducted according to
stringent guidelines, it is "generally accepted as a reasonably relia-
ble method of restoring a person's memory." 59 Accordingly, hyp-
54 See, e.g., Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1122-23 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986); Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 85-90 (Fla.
App. 1983); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 826-27 (Miss. 1984); State v. Weston, 16
Ohio App. 3d 279, 287, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (1984).
55 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
56 Id. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92. The Hurd court's position seems completely inconsis-
tent with the Frye test. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
57 86 N.J. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92 (citing Spector & Foster, supra note 15, at 584).
For a different approach, see State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), where a state
prosecutor argued that post-hypnotic testimony need not be truthful to be admissible;
he argued that "it need only be based on 'what the witness actually saw or experienced,
as opposed to suggestion.'" Id. at 769. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this
argument because "the fact that a witness's memory results from hypnosis bears on the
question of whether her testimony is sufficiently competent, relevant, and more proba-
tive than prejudicial, to merit admission at all." Id. Hypnosis can "create a memory of
perceptions" which neither did occur nor could have occurred, and thus, elicit a "mem-
ory" from a person unable to "establish that she perceived the events she asserts to
remember." Id.
58 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92. But see Note, Breakingfrom the Hurd: Missouri
Reects Eighth Circuit-An Analysis of the Admissibility of Post-hypnotic Testimony, 51 Mo. L.
REv. 793, 806 (1986) (citing Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis, 27 INr'LJ. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIs 312, 328 (1979)) (some experts recognize that the purpose of
hypnosis is often not to elicit a blocked subconscious memory, but rather to induce
more details regarding an event readily communicated prior to hypnosis). This applica-
tion of hypnosis heightens the risk of fallacious results. First, repeated questioning cre-
ates an environment conducive to suggestion, see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying
text, or confabulation, see supra note 31. See Note, supra, at 806. Second, often the rea-
son for not remembering a detail before hypnosis is "that the subject did not have the
opportunity or the motivation at the time of the event to be cognitive of the detail
sought. In such a situation there is no memory to be refreshed, only a strong motivation to
comply with the hypnotist's request to provide more details." Id. (emphasis added).
59 Hurd, 86 N.J. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
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notically refreshed testimony may be admissible if the trier of fact
finds that the hypnotic procedure in the particular case was a "rea-
sonably reliable" method of restoring recall comparable in accuracy
to "normal recall." 60
The Hurd court enumerated six prerequisites to introduction of
hypnotically refreshed testimony.61 However, conceding "the po-
tential for abuse of hypnosis, the genuine likelihood of suggestive-
ness and error, and the consequent risk of injustice," 62 the Hurd
court held that the proponent offering hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony must establish its admissibility by "clear and convincing evi-
dence." 63 Several state and federal courts have adopted the Hurd
approach.64
4. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony Assessed on a
Case-by-Case Basis
Some courts eschew any per se rule in assessing hypnotically re-
freshed testimony and do not view compliance with procedural safe-
guards as guaranteeing admissibility.65 For example, in McQueen v.
Garrison,66 the Fourth Circuit held that a court must conduct a "bal-
anced inquiry" 67 in each case to determine if the testimony was dis-
torted by pretrial hypnosis. Under this approach, the Hurd
60 Id. The Hurd court considered "normal recall" as "often historically inaccurate."
The hypnotic procedure is "reasonably reliable if it is able to yield recollections as accu-
rate as those of an ordinary witness." Id.
61 Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97. The six requirements are:
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis
must conduct the session .... Second, the professional conducting the
hypnotic session should be independent of and not regularly employed
by the prosecutor, investigator or defense .... Third, any information
given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or the defense prior
to the hypnotic session must be recorded, either in writing or another
suitable form.... Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should
obtain from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject
remembers them .... Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the
subject must be recorded .... Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject
should be present during any phase of the hypnotic session, including the
pre-hypnotic testing and the post-hypnotic interview.
Id.
62 Id. at 547, 432 A.2d at 97.
63 Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
64 See cases cited supra note 54.
65 See, e.g. Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 492-93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010 (1986) (probative value of the testimony weighed against its prejudicial effect);
State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 625, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (1984) (weigh "totality of
circumstances").
66 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987).
67 Id. at 958. The term "balanced inquiry" describes a court's determination as to
whether the hypnotically refreshed testimony "had a basis that was independent of the
dangers associated with hypnosis-in other words .... whether a witness' memory and
ability to testify from it was distorted by the earlier hypnosis." Id.
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safeguards are rejected "as a litmus test for determining the reliabil-
ity of pre-trial hypnosis."' 68 Although compliance with Hurd-type
safeguards is relevant to a court's "balanced inquiry," admissibility
does not rest solely on the adequacy of the hypnotic procedure.
Even if a proponent demonstrates strict compliance with procedural
safeguards, his opponent "may still be able to demonstrate by ex-
pert testimony that a witness' memory has been irreparably dis-
torted by hypnosis."'69 On the other hand, where the hypnotic
procedure was "flawed," a court may find that "a witness' testimony




In 1986, the,,Arkansas Supreme Court adopted a per se inadmis-
sible approach and excluded a criminal defendant's hypnotically re-
freshed testimony in Rock v. State.71 The court limited the
defendant's testimony to a reiteration of her story prior to hypno-
sis. 7 2 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider the constitutionality of Arkansas's per se rule and overruled the
Arkansas Supreme Court.73
A. Facts
The State of Arkansas charged Vickie Lorene Rock with man-
slaughter for shooting her husband after an argument on July 2,
1983. The couple's argument culminated in a physical struggle.
According to an investigating officer's testimony, Mrs. Rock picked
up a gun and "pointed it toward the floor and her husband hit her
again and she shot him." 74 Rock could not remember the precise
details of the incident. Without asking the court or informing the
prosecutor, Rock's attorney hired a psychiatrist, Dr. Betty Back, to
refresh Rock's recollection through two hypnotic sessions.75 Dr.
Back first conducted a pre-hypnotic interview to ascertain Rock's
recollection of the shooting. Dr. Back took handwritten notes dur-
ing the pre-hypnotic interview, but she did not make a video or
sound recording. Dr. Back tape-recorded both hypnotic sessions,
68 Id. at 958.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78 (Ark. 1986).
72 Id.
73 Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2708 (1987).
74 Id.
75 Rock v. State, 288 Ark. at 568, 708 S.W.2d at 79.
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but failed to video tape either.76 Rock did not relate any new infor-
mation during either hypnotic session, although her post-hypnosis
statements included previously unremembered details about the
night of the shooting.77
After learning about the hypnotic sessions, the prosecutor
moved to exclude Rock's hypnotically refreshed testimony. At a
pretrial hearing, the trial judge granted the prosecutor's motion and
refused to admit Rock's hypnotically refreshed testimony. He is-
sued an order limiting Rock's testimony to "matters remembered
and stated to [Dr. Back] prior to being placed under hypnosis." '78
At trial, the judge held the hypnotically refreshed testimony
"inadmissible because of its unreliability and because of the effect of
hypnosis on cross-examination. ' 79 The trial court permitted Rock
to introduce a gun expert's testimony indicating that the gun in
question was prone to fire if hit or dropped, without the trigger be-
ing pulled, but Rock's own testimony was limited in accordance with
the court order.80 Thejury convicted Rock of manslaughter and the
court sentenced her to ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. 8'
B. The Arkansas Supreme Court Decision
Affirming Rock's conviction, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that hypnotically refreshed testimony remains inadmissible whether
considered under the Frye test or by "traditional evidentiary con-
cepts." 82 The court found that hypnotically refreshed testimony
failed the Frye test because many courts, tracking expert opinion in
the field, have concluded that such testimony is "inherently unrelia-
ble and without sufficient acceptance to allow it in the court-
room."'83 The court also found that, according to "traditional
76 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2706-07. Because Dr. Back did not video tape the hypnotic
sessions, the Court's deference to the trial judge's conclusion that Dr. Back did not sug-
gest responses to Rock appears unwarranted. See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying
text.
77 Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 2707. For example, Rock remembered that she had her thumb
on the hammer of the gun and no finger on the trigger, which suggested that her gun
was defective and had misfired the night her husband died.
78 Id at 2707 (quoting the pretrial order).
79 Rock, 288 Ark. at 568, 708 S.W.2d at 79.
80 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2707.
81 Id.
82 Rock, 288 Ark. at 579, 708 S.W.2d at 80 (citing UNIF. R. EVID. 403) (Although
"[s]ome critics contend that Frye is too strict and will exclude helpful and probative
evidence... we would find the hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible by either
the Frye test, or some form of it, or by traditional evidentiary concepts.").
83 Id. See, e.g., Collins v. Sup. Ct., 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (en banc);
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); People v.
Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 453 N.E.2d 484 (1983). See also McCoRMICK
oN EVIDENCE § 206, at 633 (3d ed. 1984) ("The more prevalent view is that testimony
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evidentiary concepts," '8 4 hypnotically refreshed testimony is inad-
missible because the dangers of admitting such testimony outweigh
its probative value.8 5
Responding to Rock's contention that the limitations on her
testimony violated her right to present a defense, the Arkansas
Supreme Court found no error in restricting Rock's testimony to
her pre-hypnotic recollection.8 6 Rock had the burden of establish-
ing a reliable record of pre-hypnotic memory and therefore had to
abide by the record she offered.8 7
Further, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that exclusion of
Rock's hypnotically refreshed testimony did not violate her constitu-
tional right to testify.88 Although fundamental, a defendant's right
to testify does not stand unqualified, and without limitation. Even
defendants must adhere to "the rules of procedure and evidence."8 9
Supporting this contention, the court cited two cases excluding a
defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony where the defendant
had no pre-hypnotic recollection of the crime.90 The Arkansas
Supreme Court reasoned that no rule requires a court to admit "evi-
dence of uncertain value to go to a defense that is otherwise com-
pletely uncorroborated." 9 1  The court only restricted Rock's
testimony by "standard rules of evidence." 92 Based on the informa-
tion before the court, not only is the probative value of hypnotically
refreshed testimony "questionable," it is "substantially out-
weighed" by the problems associated with it. 9 3 Moreover, Rock
about the post hypnotic memories is inadmissible."); infra notes 187-90 and accompany-
ing text.
84 288 Ark. at 570, 708 S.W.2d at 80.
85 Id. at 572, 708 S.W.2d at 81. See also supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
The Arkansas Supreme Court also rejected adopting the Hurd safeguards. 288 Ark. at
573-76, 708 S.W.2d at 81-83. See supra note 61 for a description of the Hurd safeguards.
86 288 Ark. at 575-76, 708 S.W.2d at 83-84 (Rock's pre-hypnotic recollection was
ascertained by Dr. Back's notes and enlarged by Dr. Back's memory of Rock's pre-hyp-
notic memory).
87 Id. at 577, 708 S.W.2d at 84.
88 See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
89 Rock, 288 Ark. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 85.
90 Id. at 578-79, 708 S.W.2d at 85 (citing Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp.
1113 (D. Va. 1976); State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (1984)). See
supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
Mere absence of admissible evidence does not trigger a violation of defendant's
right to present relevant testimony. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
91 Rock, 288 Ark. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 85 (quoting Greenfield, 413 F. Supp. at 1120-
21). See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. The court applied this reasoning
despite the fact that Mrs. Rock's testimony was not "completely uncorroborated." Other
courts, however, have noted that reliance on corroborative evidence may be misplaced.
See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
92 Rock, 288 Ark. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 85.
93 Id. The problems include a hypnotic subject's 1) propensity to confabulate, see
supra note 3 1; 2) increased confidence in both true and false memories, see infra note 184;
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stood in a position more advantageous than a defendant without any
pre-hypnotic memory.94
Rock appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the constitutionality of Arkansas's per se rule
excluding a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony. 95
C. United States Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The Court considered the narrow issue of "whether a criminal
defendant's right to testify may be restricted by a state rule that ex-
cludes her post-hypnosis testimony." 96 In a 5-4 decision written by
Justice Blackmun, 97 the Court reversed Rock's conviction. The ma-
jority held that criminal defendants have a right to testify on their
own behalf under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment, and
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony.98
The Court declared that, although certain limitations restrict a de-
fendant's right to present relevant testimony, state evidentiary rules
"may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve." 99
According to the majority, Arkansas's per se rule excluding all
hypnotically refreshed testimony "infringes impermissibly" on a
criminal defendant's right to testify on his own behalf.100 Proce-
dural safeguards such as tape or video recording can reduce inaccu-
3) increased ability to recite peripheral detail, see infra note 185; 4) increased credibility
solely because of hypnotic procedure, see infra note 185; and 5) resistance against effec-
tive cross-examination, see infra note 178. Rock, 288 Ark. at 572, 708 S.W.2d at 81.
94 Rock, 288 Ark. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 85.
The Arkansas Supreme Court viewed Rock as in a better position than a defendant
with no pre-hypnotic memory because Rock:
was allowed to relate the substance of her version of the shooting to the
jury, which she had remembered prior to hypnosis. [Rock's] defense was
that the shooting was an accident and this she was able to adequately
relay to thejury. She testified that she and her husband were quarrelling,
that he pushed her against the wall, that she wanted to leave because she
was frightened, and her husband wouldn't let her go. She said her hus-
band's behavior that night was unusual, and the shooting was an accident,
that she didn't mean to do it and that she would not intentionally hurt her
husband.
Id.,
95 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2708.
96 Id. at 2710.
97 Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Powell and Stevensjoined. ChiefJustice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia joined.
98 107 S. Ct. at 2710-11. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
99 Id. at 2711.
100 Id at 2714-15.
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racies. 10 Moreover, corroborating evidence and other traditional
means of assessing accuracy may verify hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony.10 2 "A State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evi-
dence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an
individual case."10 3  According to the majority, the Arkansas
Supreme Court should have considered two circumstances in deter-
mining the admissibility of Rock's hypnotically refreshed testimony:
1) the expert testimony corroborating Rock's hypnotically refreshed
memories about the defective condition of the gun, and 2) the trial
judge's conclusion, based on the tape recordings, that Dr. Back did
not suggest responses with leading questions. 10 4
Justice Blackmun, however, readily admitted the lack of scien-
tific consensus regarding hypnosis. 10 5 He acknowledged that
although hypnosis may increase recall, "no data" shows that hypno-
sis enhances recall of only accurate information without a corre-
sponding increase in false information. 10 6 Nevertheless, the Court
rejected the Arkansas Supreme Court's per se rule of exclusion; a
rule based on Arkansas' conclusion that a defendant's testimony re-
lating facts which she cannot prove she recalled prior to hypnosis
lacks reliability.10 7
2. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, written by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, em-
phasized problems that undermine the reliability of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony, which he characterized as "inherently
unreliable."'' 08 He noted that the majority opinion conceded that
individual responses to hypnosis vary greatly and that the hypnotic
subject "becomes subject to suggestion, is likely to confabulate, and
101 Id. at 2714.
102 Id.
103 Id. But see infra note 163 and accompanying text discussing the lack of current
methodology to assess accurately the reliability or credibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony in an "individual case."
104 107 S. Ct. at 2714. But see infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text, discussing
problems with relying on corroborative evidence and inherent suggestibility in hypnotic
procedure. Some studies show that it may not be possible to tell if a question is "lead-
ing." See infra note 148.
105 107 S. Ct. at 2713. Despite the unreliability of hypnosis as a memory enhancer,
the Court apparently found it significant that investigators have successfuly used hypno-
sis to elicit investigative leads or identifications which were subsequently confirmed by
independent evidence. Id. at 2713-14.
106 Id. at 2713 n.18 (citing Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific Status of Refreshing
Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253J. A.M.A. 1918, 1921 (1985)).
107 Id. at 2714. Because the Court conceded the unsettled scientific status regarding
the reliability of hypnosis as a memory enhancer, see infra notes 195-206 and accompany-
ing text discussing the future of the Frye test's constitutionality as applied to hypnosis.
108 107 S. Ct. at 2715 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also infra note 163.
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experiences artificially increased confidence in both true and false
memories following hypnosis." 10 9 The Chief Justice could find no
constitutional justification for the Court's conclusion "that a state
trial court must attempt to make its own scientific assessment of reli-
ability in each case it is confronted with a request for the admission
of hypnotically induced testimony." 110
The Chief Justice further argued that an individual's right to
present evidence on his own behalf remains subject to "reasonable
restrictions" and" 'may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.' "" The
ChiefJustice believed that Arkansas's rule designed to prohibit "in-
herently suspect" testimony falls within this language." 12
Finally, the Chief Justice noted that the Supreme Court tradi-
tionally defers to the states with respect to criminal trial rules and
procedures." 13 Such deference should control in areas like hypnosis
where" 'scientific understanding ... is still in its infancy.' ' 114 Until
a general scientific consensus on the uses of hypnosis emerges, "the
Constitution does not warrant this Court's mandating its own view
of how to deal with the issue."' 15
III
ANALYSIS
Rock based her claim that the Arkansas rule impermissibly ex-
cluded her hypnotically refreshed testimony on "her constitutional
right to testify in her own defense." 116 The Supreme Court held
Arkansas's rule of exclusion unconstitutional as an "arbitrary" re-
striction 17 on the right to testify. However, neither the Constitu-
tion nor Supreme Court precedent mandates the Court's
conclusion. Supreme Court due process decisions demonstrate that
a defendant's right to present evidence on one's own behalf is not
absolute." ' 8 Similarly, Supreme Court compulsory process deci-
109 Id. On suggestion, see infra note 169 and accompanying text. On confabulation,
see supra note 31. On increased confidence, see infra note 184.
110 107 S. Ct. at 2715.
111 Id. at 2715-16 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). The
Constitution does not exempt a defendant from complying with "'rules of procedure
and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of
guilt and innocence.'" 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302).
112 107 S. Ct. at 2716.
11" Id.
114 Id. (quoting majority opinion, 107 S. Ct. at 2714).
115 Id.
116 Id at 2708. See infra note 157 and accompanying text for Supreme Court's analy-
sis of the constitutional sources of the right to testify.
117 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 125-55 and accompanying text.
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sions recognize other legitimate interests in the criminal trial pro-
cess which qualify the right to present relevant testimony.11 9 The
Rock decision protects a defendant beyond the constitutional re-
quirements and deviates from the traditional deference accorded
the states in establishing their own criminal procedures and trial
rules. 120
The Court's holding in Rock permits admission of evidence not
subject to traditional methods of revealing inconsistencies 21 and
casts doubt on the continued validity of the Frye standard of assess-
ing scientific methods of producing evidence. 122 Further, imple-
mentation of procedural safeguards, constitutionally permissible
under Rock, will not adequately alleviate the inherent dangers in ad-
mitting hypnotically refreshed testimony and will negatively affect
the judicial system. 123 Finally, courts determined to preserve exclu-
sion of hypnotically refreshed testimony may employ a per se inad-
missible approach in practice. 124
A. Constitutionality of Arkansas Supreme Court Approach
1. Due Process and Limits on the Right to Present Evidence
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands."' 125 The Rock majority acknowledged that "the
right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation,"
although any "restrictions . . .may not be arbitrary or dispropor-
tionate to the purposes they are designed to serve."' 126 Yet Justice
Blackmun never fully explained the "arbitrary or disproportionate"
nature of Arkansas's exclusionary rule. He merely stated that
"[w]holesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbi-
trary restriction on the right to testify in the absence of clear evi-
dence by the State repudiating the validity of all post-hypnosis
recollections."' 127 In this case, however, the Arkansas trial court did
not declare any wholesale inadmissibility of Rock's testimony. It
permitted Rock to testify in accordance with her pre-hypnotic
119 See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
120 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also infra notes 153-55
and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 165-94 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying text.
123 See infra notes 207-29 and accompanying text.
124 See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
125 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
126 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
127 Id. at 2714 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the task of repudiating the validity
of all post-hypnotic recollections may not be feasible. See infra notes 163 & 177 and
accompanying text. Because "wholesale inadmissibility" was not defined further, this
Note assumes it has no special meaning beyond its common usage.
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recollection. 128
Although Arkansas's rejection of a procedural safeguard ap-
proach 129 differed from how the Supreme Court would decide such
a "novel and difficult question,"1 3 0 it does not follow that Arkansas's
rule of exclusion violates the Constitution. The Rock majority
deemed Arkansas's rule "an arbitrary restriction on the right to tes-
tify."1 31 Labeling the Arkansas rule "arbitrary" seems tenuous,
however, given the substantial expert and judicial support it en-
joys.132 Moreover, the Court's rule requiring the trier of fact to
evaluate hypnotically refreshed testimony on a case-by-case basis,
when even experts cannot reliably do so, seems more akin to an ar-
bitrary standard than Arkansas's per se rule "exclud[ing] testimony
whose trustworthiness is inherently suspect."' 3 3 When ajury is in-
capable of assessing the reliability of the evidence, "it denigrates the
criminal trial's truth seeking functions. In each instance, guilt or
innocence becomes a matter of mere conjecture."' 134
The Constitution unquestionably permits "testimonial privi-
leges or nonarbitrary rules that disqualify those incapable of observ-
ing events due to mental infirmity or infancy from being
witnesses." 135 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, in his dissent, responded to
the majority's unsatisfactory explanation of the "arbitrary or dispro-
portionate" nature of the Arkansas rule stating, "I fail to discern any
meaningful constitutional difference between [testimonial privileges
or nonarbitrary rules] and the one at issue here."' 136
In light of a "flexible"' 137 concept of due process, Arkansas's
rule excluding testimony "whose trustworthiness is inherently sus-
pect"'138 does not appear to violate due process. In Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi, 139 the Supreme Court viewed a criminal defendant's right to
128 See supra note 94 for the Arkansas Supreme Court's description of Rock's admit-
ted testimony.
129 Rock, 288 Ark. 566, 575, 708 S.W.2d 78, 83 (1986) ("In light of the questionable
probative value of such proof and the risks inherent in the means by which it is retrieved,
we think it would be a serious mistake to further encumber the pretrial process with the
steps outlined in Hurd.").
130 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 2714. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
132 Black's Law Dictionary defines arbitrary as "in an 'arbitrary' manner, as fixed or
done capriciously or at pleasure. Without adequate determining principle; not founded
in the nature of things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason or judg-
ment; depending on the will alone .... Without fair, solid, and substantial cause; that is,
without cause based upon the law ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979).
133 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
134 Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REv. 119, 127 (1987).
135 Rock, at 2711 n.ll (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967)).
136 Id. at 2716 n.l 1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
137 See supra text accompanying note 125.
138 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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due process as "the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations." 1 40 The Chambers Court admitted testimony
that Mississippi courts excluded because it found that the testimony
excluded bore "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness." 14 1
Rock's hypnotically refreshed testimony, however, did not re-
veal such assurances of trustworthiness. The majority in Rock relied
on "the defective condition of the gun" and the trial judge's conclu-
sion that Dr. Back "did not suggest responses with leading ques-
tions" to support its contention that the trier of fact could rely on
Rock's hypnotically refreshed testimony and hence the court should
admit it "in this particular case."' 142 Neither of these circumstances
provide strong support for the Court's contention.
First, the Court's focus on corroborative evidence is arguably
misplaced. As one court recently stated:
Reliability of hypnotically generated testimony, not its plausibility,
should determine whether it is accepted. Polygraph evidence,
voice stress test results, and pathometer exam readings are disal-
lowed because the procedures used have not been generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community as producing reliable results;
such evidence does not become admissible because other evidence corroborates
it. For the court to admit what seems to be true and exclude what
does not subverts the traditional role of jurors as the exclusive
judges of the facts. With corroboration 'the linchpin of admissi-
bility,' false hypnotically produced testimony based on 'pseudo
memory' which happens to coincide with other evidence could
come in. Crucial reliable but uncorroborated testimony would be
barred. Consequences of such a rule are readily imagined. 143
Reliance on corroborative evidence may result in "bootstrapping
admissibility"' 144 solely because both sets of evidence support the
same proposition. In fact, corroborative evidence actually reduces
the need for hypnotically refreshed testimony because "the cor-
roborating evidence could often be used in its place."' 14 5
Second, scientific evidence does not support the Court's confi-
dence in the trial judge's conclusion that Dr. Back did not suggest
140 Id. at 294.
141 Id. at 302.
142 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714. See supra text accompanying note 104.
143 Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 137 n.24 (Alaska 1986) (emphasis added)
(quoting People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 22, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932 (1982)).
144 Id. at 137.
145 Id. An additional problem with relying on corroborating evidence is that "the
more suggestive the hypnotic interview, the more 'corroborative' detail there is likely to
be." Id. at 137 n.24. Hypnotists often unconsciously cue their subjects into making
certain statements. Diamond, supra note 31, at 338. When those statements prove to be
accurate, the hypnotist believes the recollections are "independently" corroborated. Id.
In fact, the subject may have been responding to the hypnotist's cues, especially if the
hypnotist is familiar with the actual events. Id. at 338-39.
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responses with leading questions. Suggestion is an integral part of
the hypnotic process and its effects on a subject are not solely the
product of leading questions.146 Even the Court acknowledged that
procedural safeguards, assuring that the hypnotist asks no leading
questions, "cannot control the subject's own motivations or any ten-
dency to confabulate."' 147 Yet the Court seemed to claim that an
absence of leading questions would cure hypnosis of its suggestive
effect.148 Furthermore, even if procedural safeguards cure hypnosis
of its suggestive effect, Dr. Back did not abide by strict procedural
guidelines when hypnotizing Rock. 149 For example, one Hurd pro-
cedural safeguard requires that "all contacts between the hypnotist
and subject... be recorded."' 150 Dr. Back made no video recording,
although she tape recorded the hypnotic sessions. She did not tape
the pre-hypnotic interviews and the Court's opinion made no refer-
ence to a tape recording of any formal post-hypnotic interview.' 5 '
Clearly, Dr. Back's procedure could not pass scrutiny under the
Hurd standard. 152
Moreover, the Chambers Court expressly denied any reduction
in the respect traditionally given States in forming and administer-
ing their criminal trial rules and procedures.' 55 Both the accused
and the State must comply with the court's rules of procedure and
evidence designed to fairly and reliably ascertain guilt and inno-
cence. 1' 4 Given the controversy surrounding the validity, reliability
and trustworthiness of hypnotically refreshed testimony, the
Supreme Court should continue its deference to the states by al-
lowing them to implement their own rules. 155
2. Compulsory Process and Limits on the Right to Present Testimony
The sixth amendment's compulsory process clause guarantees a
criminal defendant "compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in
his favor."' 156 Although the Constitution does not expressly grant a
146 See infra notes 169-70.
147 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
148 Id. But see M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 23 (describing studies that suggest it may
not be possible to determine if a question is leading).
149 See Rock, 288 Ark. 566, 573-74, 708 S.W.2d 78, 82 (1986) (noting that Rock had
not fully complied with the Hurd guidelines).
150 State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 546, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981). See also supra note 61.
151 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
152 The Hurd standard is discussed supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
153 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973).
154 Id. at 302.
155 "[IThe Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a
finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules." Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6
(1983)).
156 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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criminal defendant the right to testify on his own behalf, the
Supreme Court has declared that such a right is logically included
within the sixth amendment. 157 However, "[m]ore than the mere
absence of testimony is necessary to establish a violation" of the de-
fendant's right to present relevant testimony. 58 The right to offer
relevant testimony "may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process."' 159
In Rock, Arkansas's interest was in barring unreliable testimony.
The Supreme Court, however, held that such an interest did "not
extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual
case."' 160 At first glance, Justice Blackmun's reasoning seems per-
suasive because not every hypnotically refreshed recollection neces-
sarily lacks accuracy-generally, the amount of detail, both accurate
and inaccurate, increases.' 6 1 Difficulties arise, however, when a
court must distinguish the reliable and credible portions of testi-
mony from the unreliable and the incredible. Although other evi-
dence, such as eyewitness testimony, may lack reliability, the
American judicial system presumes the trier of fact is capable of as-
sessing its reliability and credibility. 162 In contrast, the weight of
current scientific evidence suggests that no one can determine the
reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony in a specific case. 163
157 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709. The right to testify on one's own behalf "is one of the
rights that 'are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.' " Id. (quoting
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)). A criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to call "witnesses in his favor" is applicable to the States through the
fourteenth amendment. Id. "Logically included" under the sixth amendment's protec-
tion "is a [defendant's] right to testify himself." Id. The right to testify "is also a neces-
sary corollary to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony." Id. at
2710.
158 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (referring to Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (the "only recent" Supreme Court decision address-
ing sixth amendment compulsory process).
'59 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). See e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204, 215-16 (1972) (where state's witness unavailable, the court satisfies con-
frontation clause requirements when it admits the witness' prior-recorded testimony, if
prior testimony bears "indicia of reliability" that afford trier of fact a satisfactory basis
for evaluating truth of prior statement).
160 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714. According to the Court, certain "circumstances present
an argument for admissibility of [Rock's] testimony in this particular case." Id. But see
supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
162 See infra notes 172-77.
163 "[T]here is 'no truly objective scientific test for determining whether information
related during a trance state is reliable.' " State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601, 603 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 110, 436 A.2d 170, 177
(1981)). See also Diamond, supra note 31, at 340 ("wrong to claim that hypnotically en-
hanced memories are always false or distorted .... rather .... there exist no means to
determine with certainty whether or not such falsity or distortion has been introduced
by hypnotism"). The nature of hypnosis and its effects on memory may transform "be-
liefs of the hypnotist or subject ... into inaccurate memories that the subject reports,
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It is one thing to theorize that testimony "may" be reliable in a
particular case and quite another to accurately assess such testimony
as "actually" reliable in a particular case. The Rock decision affords
a defendant protection which exceeds constitutional requirements.
While protecting the rights of an accused may be a primary goal in
the criminal process, "it is not the only one; another is the ascertain-
ment of guilt and innocence .... '[A] criminal trial ... ceases to be a
judicial proceeding when the outcome rests on evidence that cannot
be rationally considered.' "4
B. Future Impact of the Decision
1. Admission of Potentially Critical Evidence Not Subject to
Traditional Means of Revealing Inconsistencies
The current scientific evidence on hypnosis suggests that the
trier of fact is unqualified to assess the reliability of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony on a case-by-case basis. The research of eminent
hypnosis experts, Dr. Martin T. OrneI65 and Dr. Bernard L. Dia-
mond,' 66 reveals a hypnotic subject's suggestibility and propensity
to confabulate, 67 as well as the inability of the hypnotist or any
other expert to verify the accuracy of any enhanced memory. 168 In
Dr. Diamond's opinion, "[h]ypnosis is, almost by definition, a state
of increased suggestibility."' 1 9 In Dr. Orne's opinion, the hypnotist
may influence the subject without the subject ever realizing it.170
believes, and subsequently is willing to testify to under oath." M. ORNE, supra note 16,
at 42. No current methodology can eliminate this possibility or distinguish in actual
cases accurate from inaccurate post-hypnosis recall, unless the facts are verifiable. Id.
Moreover, absent verified facts, neither subject nor hypnotist can identify the accurate
recollections. Id. at 20. Generally no one can verify the "true" facts of a case; if they
could, hypnosis to "refresh" recall would be unnecessary. Where the facts to be
remembered are unknown, courts tend to accept "plausible recollections" as accurate.
Id. See also infra notes 168-77 & 178-94 and accompanying text.
164 Leading Cases, supra note 134, at 127 (quoting Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, 73 MicH. L. REv. 71, 157 (1974)). Cf Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302
(1973) (exercise of right to present witnesses in own defense must comply with estab-
lished rules "designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt
and innocence").
165 See supra note 16.
166 Dr. Diamond is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley and a
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco. He re-
ceived his M.D. at the University of California, Berkeley in 1939.
167 Seesupra note 31.
168 See M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 1-2; Diamond, supra note 13, at 314.
169 Diamond, supra note 31, at 333.
170 M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 8-9. Hypnotists frequently encourage their subjects,
with phrases such as "Good, fine, you're doing well." Id. at 8. This acts as an implicit
suggestion. Subjects seek to maintain this approval; consequently, if the hypnotist
merely stops expressing approval (as opposed to expressing disapproval), such as simply
being silent instead of saying "good," he makes it clear that something different or more
is wanted. Id. Moreover, once details reported by the subject are accepted as valid by
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Moreover, even an expert cannot determine the reliability of the
subject's "memories" resulting from such suggestions. 171
Although ordinary eyewitness testimony is criticized as having
similar defects, Dr. Diamond points out that witnesses not subjected
to hypnosis may exhibit hesitancy, expressions of doubt, or body
language communicating lack of confidence in their recall. 172 These
witnesses may also concede the fallibility of their memory. More-
over, jurors often rely on these indicators of uncertainty in evaluat-
ing witness testimony.173 Previously hypnotized witnesses, however,
often become so confident of their memory that they do not hesitate
to relate what they believe are the facts. 174 "A remarkable feature of
hypnosis is its apparent ability to resolve doubts and uncertain-
ties." 1 75 Not only is the recall likely to be inaccurate, but neither
experts nor the witness himself can determine its accuracy.' 76 Ac-
the hypnotist, that very acceptance may persuade the subject that these "recollections"
are accurate. Id. at 9. The danger exists that there "recollections" may be confabula-
tions, see supra note 31, or extremely tentative memories that the subject was not confi-
dent enough to report as true recollection prior to hypnosis. M. ORNE, supra note 16, at
9. Hence, even extremely subtle communication may influence the hypnotic subject
without either realizing what is happening. Id. at 21.
Further, subjects invariably have some expectations and preconceptions about hyp-
nosis, and such beliefs can function as a prehypnotic suggestion. Id. at 8. "Preconcep-
tions about what will occur during hypnosis can produce specific hypnotic results,
without any additional suggestion by the hypnotist." Id. The risk of this phenomenon
seems at its highest when the subject has a high stake in the outcome; namely, a criminal
defendant whose life and liberty is at stake, thus creating a strong incentive to "remem-
ber" details exculpatory to himself.
171 Id. at 26.
172 Diamond, supra note 31, at 339. Dr. Diamond also points out that while interro-
gators may use "key words" to influence a witness' memory or testimony, hypnotic sub-
jects are much more vulnerable to suggestion than ordinary witnesses. In his opinion,
"[p]retrial hypnosis of a witness cannot be considered a harmless form of 'coaching' or
legitimate preparation of the witness for the courtroom experience." Id. at 342. He
argues it is even more objectionable because "it accomplishes the same effect, yet allows
the perpetrator, the witness, and the trier of fact to remain unaware that the perversion
of the evidence has occurred." Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 339-40. See also M. ORNE, supra notes 16 & 163; infra notes 184-86 and
accompanying text.
In reviewing the guidelines espoused in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86
(1981), see supra text accompanying notes 61-64, the supreme courts of both California
and Pennsylvania rejected the Hurd court's analysis that hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony should be admissible because ordinary eyewitness testimony may be erroneous or
inaccurate. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 50-51, 723 P.2d 1354, 1373, 181 Cal. Rptr.
243, 262-63 (citing Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 109, 436 A.2d 170, 177
(1981)).
But see Spector & Foster, supra note 15, at 590-97 (arguing that previously hypno-
tized witness "may be able to recount an observed event more fully and accurately than
any other witness," yet acknowledging several problems with the hypnotic process that
could hamper the reliability of post-hypnotic testimony).
175 Diamond, supra note 31, at 339.
176 Id. See also supra note 163.
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cordingly, it is naive to believe that a trial judge or jury can confi-
dently assess the reliability of a particular hypnotic session.' 77
Scientific research and studies also demonstrate that hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony is not subject to effective cross-examina-
tion. 178 The Rock majority held that Arkansas' per se rule
unconstitutionally restricted Rock's right to testify on her own be-
half because the state did not show "that hypnotically enhanced tes-
timony is always so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional
means of evaluating credibility ..... 179 However, while it is cer-
tainly possible for such testimony to be accurate in some cases,
there are no known means of assessing its accuracy or credibility in a
particular case. 18 0 The Court conceded that "effective cross-exami-
nation [of a previously hypnotized witness is] more difficult,"' 18 yet
two paragraphs later asserted that "[c]ross-examination, even in the
face of a confident defendant, is an effective tool for revealing in-
consistencies."' 182 This latter statement contravenes much of the
scientific evidence.' 83
A person's confidence level while testifying is an important fac-
tor weighed by the trier of fact in assessing credibility. A high confi-
dence level makes cross-examination "more difficult."' 84  A
witness's confidence in his memory is "crucial for court testimony,"
177 Shirley, 31 Cal.3d at 39 n.24, 723 P.2d at 1366 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255 n.24.
See also State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 478-79, 701 P.2d 909, 923 (1985) ("it is virtually
impossible for the subject or the trained, professional hypnotist to distinguish between
true memory and pseudo memory").
178 Often the perceived credibility of a witness is dependent on the effectiveness of
cross-examination. The fact that hypnosis most often results in the reporting of more
information, containing both accurate and inaccurate details, Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2713
n.18, is particularly troublesome. Many courts have concluded that effective cross-ex-
amination of hypnotically refreshed testimony is not possible. This conclusion relies
upon the "grave misgivings" articulated by the scientific community, such as
the heightened suggestivity, the increased desire to satisfy the hypnotist,
the tendency to confabulate, and the inability to distinguish in one's wak-
ing state the fact from the fantasy.... [T]he hypnotic subject, upon
awakening, is often imbued with a confidence and conviction as to his
memory which was not present before. Prehypnosis uncertainty becomes
molded, in light of additional recall experienced under hypnosis, into
certitude, with the subject unaware of any suggestions that he acted upon
or any confabulation in which he engaged. The subject's firm belief in
the veracity of his enhanced recollection is honestly held, and cannot be
undermined through cross-examination.
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 50-51, 723 P.2d 1354, 1373, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 262,
(1982) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d 170, 174-75
(1981)). See also infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
179 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
180 Id. at 2715 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 2713.
182 Id. at 2714.
183 See supra note 178 and infra notes 184-85.
184 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2713 ("the subject experiences 'memory hardening,' which
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while of less importance in investigations where recollections may
be subsequently corroborated by independent evidence. 85 Regard-
less of the Rock majority's praise for the usefulness of hypnosis in
investigations, hypnotizing witnesses or defendants to refresh testi-
mony in the courtroom poses serious problems because any inaccu-
racies can have drastic consequences.18 6 Dr. Martin T. Orne
concludes that "the present state of scientific knowledge is consis-
tent with court rulings proscribing use of 'hypnotically-refreshed' eye-
witness testimony in criminal trials."18 7 Accordingly, Dr. Orne
believes that hypnosis should be limited to investigative situations
where the potential gains outweigh the risks. 188 Hypnosis "ought
not to be permitted to form the basis of testimony in court 18 9 be-
cause such testimony "may seriously jeopardize those efforts within
gives him great confidence in both true and false memories, making effective cross-ex-
amination more difficult.").
Suppose a witness recites inconsistent versions of the events each time he is asked.
Hypnosis can then "harden" the memories, consequently enabling him to "faithfully
and reliably assert his version." M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 31. In such situations, "hyp-
nosis need not produce any new information, but the procedure can bolster a formerly
unreliable witness whose credibility might easily (and perhaps deservedly) have been
undermined by cross-examination." Id. See also Diamond, supra note 31, at 339 ("With-
out adding anything substantive to the witness' memory of events, hypnosis may signifi-
cantly add to his confidence in his recall").
Most startling are studies where hypnotic subjects "pass lie detector tests while at-
testing to the truth of statements they made under hypnosis which researchers know to
be utterly false." State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980) ("ordinary 'indicia
of reliability' are completely erased"). In laboratory tests where "'false guilt was in-
duced ... through hypnosis ... subjects were so convinced of their guilt that they were
unable to pass a lie detector test thereafter.' " State ex. rel. Collins v. Superior Court,
644 P.2d 1266 (Ariz. 1982) (quoting Margolin, Hypnosis-enhanced Testimony: Valid Evidence
or Prosecutor's Tool?, TRIAL, Oct. 1981, at 42). The admissions of guilt "registered as
truths on the polygraph" although they were objectively false. Id.
185 M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 24. Notwithstanding a juror's likely preconceptions
regarding hypnosis, see infra note 125, a witness or defendant testifying to hypnotically
refreshed "memories" often portrays a misplaced confidence, which bolsters his credi-
bility. Id. at 25. Unlike non-hypnotic memory, where confidence and accuracy of recall
are generally correlated, "hypnosis dissociates accuracy of memory from the confidence
that a person places in his memory reports." Id. See also Diamond, supra note 31, at 339-
40. This misplaced confidence "can easily occur," while it is not common when hypno-
sis is not used. M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 25. Moreover, credibility can be enhanced by
an increase in periphral detail, regardless of its accuracy, so long as the details provided
are plausible. Id.
186 Id. at 13. "Despite the unreliability that hypnosis concededly may introduce," the
Rock Court praised the procedure for success in investigatory use. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at
2713 (emphasis added). See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, hyp-
nosis was not used for investigatory purposes in Rock and hypnosis as an investigative
tool was not an issue before the Court.
187 M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 41 (emphasis added).
188 Id. Dr. Diamond holds the same opinion as Dr. Orne. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
189 M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 51.
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the legal system to permit a full and fair evaluation of the facts."' 90
Hypnotists' "post hypnotic suggestion" also contributes to an
unwarranted increase in the confidence of a previously hypnotized
witness. Hypnotists give post-hypnotic suggestions "[in an effort to
improve the accuracy of hypnotic recall and minimize confabula-
tions." 19' These suggestions are express requests that the subject
"recall accurately and report only the events that really happened,
no more no less."' 92 Although use of this instruction is "impressive
to lay observers," it is inconsistent with the "forensic context of
hypnosis, which pressures the subject to provide more details."' 93
The problem is significant because "the net effect ... of these sug-
gestions will not be any increase in accuracy of recall but only an increase in
the subject's conviction that his recall is accurate."1 94
2. Future Validity of Frye Test Questionable
The Rock majority acknowledged that "there is no generally ac-
cepted theory to explain the phenomenon [of hypnosis], or even a
consensus on a single definition."'' 95 The Court, however, did not
even address the role of the Frye test's requirement that scientifically
produced evidence receive general acceptance by experts in the
field before courts admit it.19' The Court expressly limited the
scope of its ruling to the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony by criminal defendants. 97 Yet, because the right to testify
necessarily falls within the broader sweep of a defendant's sixth
amendment right to call witnesses in his favor,' 98 "the Court's pro-
hibition against arbitrary restrictions on a defendant's testimony
logically applies to the testimony in general of defense wit-
nesses."'199 The Frye test acts as a per se exclusion of mechanical or
190 Id. at 27. See also State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 n.7 (Minn. 1980) ("It is
interesting to note Dr. Orne's testimony that, in his opinion, a witness' testimony to a
'memory' retrieved under hypnosis is 'infinitely less reliable' as an indicator of truth
than the results of a polygraph test.").
191 M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 35. In Rock, Dr. Back employed post-hypnotic sugges-
tion with the defendant. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2707 n.3.
192 M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 35.
193 Id.
194 Id. (emphasis added). See also Note, supra note 58, at 806.
195 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2713.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 34-35, 38-44 & 46-53.
197 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2712 n.15.
198 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
199 Leading Cases, supra note 134, at 125.
Future litigants may attempt to distinguish a defendant's right to offer
her own testimony from her right to offer the testimony of others. They
may argue, for example, that a personal right to testify deserves more
protection than a right to present third-party testimony. Alternatively,
they may contend that the defendant's right to testify enjoys a special
status because it is supported by three different constitutional provisions.
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scientific testing results unless experts in the field agree on the relia-
bility of such results generally,200 regardless of any finding of relia-
bility in an individual case. Therefore the Frye test appears
unconstitutionally "arbitrary" under Rock. 201
Despite specific criticisms of the Frye test,20 2 its general accept-
ance standard remains essential to our criminal justice system. The
test excludes unaccepted scientific methods from misleading the
trier of fact,20 3 and prevents judges and jurors from attempting to
resolve issues beyond the reach of even expert analysis. 20 4 Rock's
implied invalidation of the Frye test with respect to hypnosis will per-
mit the trier of fact to base its verdict on unaccepted scientific meth-
ods and untestable evidence.20 5 "In its eagerness to make secure a
criminal defendant's right to testify, the Rock Court may have sig-
naled the demise, as a matter of constitutional law, of a wise rule
that contributes greatly to the integrity of the criminal process." 20 6
3. Implementation of Procedural Safeguards as a Constitutional
Response to Rock
So that trial courts may assess potentially reliable testimony in a
particular case, the Rock majority endorsed the adoption of proce-
dural guidelines as a constitutional approach for evaluating hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony.20 7 Many courts, however, faced with the
decision of whether to adopt procedural guidelines have declined to
do so, finding such safeguards incapable of guiding the trier of
fact.20 8 The California Supreme Court warned that such an ap-
Finally, they may emphasize the fifth and fourteenth amendment under-
pinnings of the right to testify as opposed to its sixth amendment
foundation.
Id. at 125 n.55.
200 See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Leading Cases, supra note 134, at
126 n.57 (Frye rule precludes case-by-case inquiry regarding reliability of scientific meth-
ods failing the general acceptance standard as overly "time consuming and expensive")
(quoting Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 526, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (1983)).
201 Accord Leading Cases, supra note 134, at 125-26.
202 See id. at 126 (Frye test criticized in recent years as difficult to apply, overly restric-
tive, and particularly problematic in the criminal context where the defendant's right to
present witnesses in his favor). See generally United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1236-37 (3d Cir. 1985) (reviewing criticisms of Frye standard).
203 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
205 See Leading Cases, supra note 134, at 127 (Rock's implicit invalidation of Frye test
disturbing; the test "has prevented justice from becoming a matter of amateur guess-
work based on unreliable techniques and has helped to assure that determinations of
guilt or innocence are not influenced by the vagaries of pseudoscience"); see also supra
notes 134 & 164 and accompanying text.
206 Leading Cases, supra note 134, at 127.
207 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
208 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 216; see also Diamond, supra note 31, at 339 (some
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proach requires trial courts to answer scientific issues "so subtle as
to confound experts. '20 9
The Rock Court conceded that hypnosis may introduce unrelia-
bility into the trial process, yet maintained that procedural safe-
guards tend to reduce inaccuracies. 210  Accordingly, Justice
Blackmun concluded that Arkansas would have remained "well
within its powers if it established guidelines to aid trial courts in the
evaluation of posthypnosis testimony."21' He candidly admitted,
however, that "[sluch guidelines do not guarantee the accuracy of
the testimony."21 2 Such guidelines not only fail to guarantee the
accuracy of such testimony but also fail to address other important
dangers at all.2 13
The California Supreme Court, after reviewing extensive expert
testimony, concluded that procedural guidelines cannot curb the
following problems: a hypnotic subject may "(1) lose his critical
judgment and begin to credit 'memories' that were formerly viewed
as unreliable; (2) confuse actual recall with confabulation and.., be
unable to distinguish between the two; and (3) ... exhibit an unwar-
ranted confidence in the validity of his ensuing recollection. ' 2 4
Other courts have rejected the Hurd guidelines2 15 for similar
reasons.
2 16
Moreover, procedural safeguards inadequately reveal whether a
hypnotic subject willfully lied or feigned hypnosis.2 1 7 Unfortu-
nately, contrary to current scientific evidence, both the general pub-
lic and the law enforcement community believe that hypnosis serves
courts' confidence "in the protection offered by stenographic, audio, or video record-
ings of the hypnotic sessions is not justified").
209 People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 40, 723 P.2d 1354, 1366, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
255 (1982). The Hurd court itself stated that "[b]ecause of the unpredictability of what
will influence a subject, it is difficult even for an expert examining a videotape of a hyp-
notic session to identify possible cues." State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 539, 432 A.2d 86, 93
(1981).
210 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2713-14.
211 Id. at 2714.
212 Id.
213 See Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 39, 723 P.2d at 1366, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255 (1982) (refer-
ring to guidelines in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 539-40, 432 A.2d 86, 93-94 (1981)).
214 Id.
215 See supra note 61.
216 See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 138 (Alaska 1986) ("prejudice/probity
balance weighs per se in favor of exclusion ... even if strict procedural safeguards are
observed"); State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601, 605 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) ("Hurd safeguards
do not address . . . a previously hypnotized witness' increased confidence in his
recollection").
217 Subjects can feign hypnosis or "deliberately lie even though deeply hypnotized,
especially when this would serve the individual's interest," M. ORNE, supra note 16, at
10, while hypnotists often accept statements made while under hypnosis at "face value."
Id. at 31. See also Diamond, supra note 31, at 337 ("even the best experts cannot consis-
tenly distinguish between actual and pretended hypnosis").
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as a valid means of assessing the truth. 218 This misapprehension
poses serious problems when using hypnosis in criminal trials, espe-
cially with a defendant who has a strong motive to convince the
court to accept his version of the facts.2 19 Moreover, experts cannot
reliably identify a subject faking hypnosis, 220 and "there is no way to
determine from the content of the 'memory' itself which parts of it
are historically accurate, which are entirely fanciful, and which are
lies."
2 2 1
Courts' use of extensive procedural safeguards also burdens
valuable judicial resources, making an already slow and inefficient
system even less efficient as criminal courts are forced to determine
whether hypnotists adhered to strict guidelines in a particular
case. 222 Dr. Orne points out the prohibitive expense that would ac-
company a case-by-case determination of admissibility, as well as
"the difficulty of getting experts qualified to testify about hypnosis
as an investigative rather than a therapeutic tool." 223 In addition to
delays resulting from extensive discovery demands, expert wit-
nesses, and special pretrial hearings, trial judges would face "scien-
tific issues so subtle as to confound the experts." 224 Resolution of
such issues can only create novel grounds for appeal, including
complications with the " 'clear and convincing'" standard of
proof22 -5 mandated by Hurd.226 This will likely lead to more litiga-
218 Many unsupported myths about hypnosis exist. Erroneous beliefs include: 1)
that hypnotists can compel deeply hypnotized subjects to commit acts which they would
not otherwise commit; 2) that hypnotists can compel subjects to tell the truth; and 3)
that subjects cannot fake being hypnotized. M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 9. Because of
these myths juries probably place undue emphasis on hypnotic recollections. See Bundy
v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla. 1985) ("hypnosis is often thought by lay persons to be a
magical thing which can produce fantastic recall ... [and] the jury is likely to place
undue emphasis on what transpired during a hypnotic session"). Moreover, law en-
forcement officers may view hypnosis as comparable to a lie detector test. M. ORNE,
supra note 16, at 31.
219 M. ORNE, supra note 16, at 11.
220 Id.
221 State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Minn. 1980). At least one expert has
testified that it may even be easier to lie while hypnotized "because from the viewpoint
of the person in the trance 'the hypnosis would put the responsibility on the shoulders
of the hypnotist.'" People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 31, 723 P.2d 1354, 1360, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243, 250 (1982) (quoting a defense expert witness).
222 Henderson, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony: Have the Courts Been
Mesmerized?, 6J. LEGAL MED. 293, 334 (1985).
223 State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1980) (citing Orne testimony).
224 Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 40, 723 P.2d at 1366, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
225 Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 40, 723 P.2d at 1366, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56 (quoting
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 535, 546, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1982)).
226 86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97 ("party seeking to introduce hypnotically re-
freshed testimony has burden of establishing admissibility by clear and convincing evi-
dence"). See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Two Justices in Hurd believed
that hypnotically refreshed testimony should not be admitted against a defendant in a
criminal trial. "To do so would have the defendant's innocence or guilt depend on the
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tion, leaving open the question of the constitutionality of trial court
decisions regarding the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony.
Finally, assuming that courts could adequately devise strict re-
quirements, their effective implementation in practice without caus-
ing undue delay and confusion remains dubious. 227 The Hurd court
itself recognized that, "Because of the unpredictability of what will
influence a subject, it is difficult even for an expert examining a
videotape... to identify possible cues." 228 Accordingly, as the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court stated, "it is vain to believe that a layman
such as a trial judge can do so."229
4. Possible Per Se Inadmissible Approach in Practice
Courts, wanting to do so, may effectively circumvent the Rock
prohibition and employ a per se inadmissible approach to hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony in practice. According to the Rock Court,
implementing guidelines that aid trial court assessment of the relia-
bility of hypnotically refreshed testimony remains constitutional.230
Given the problems and uncertainties associated with procedural
guidelines, readily acknowledged by the Supreme Court,231 trial
judges might simply conclude that the hypnotic procedure did not
satisfy such safeguards. A person's only recourse remains to enter
the already overburdened appeal process, where appellate courts
will likely defer to the trial judge unless judgment appears clearly
erroneous. The logical conclusion of this analysis condemns the
Rock decision to have no discernable effect on the admissibility of
jury's speculating, on the basis of conflicting scientific-medical testimony, whether the
identification was true recollection or implanted by the hypnosis." 86 NJ. at 550, 432
A.2d at 98 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
227 Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 31, 723 P.2d at 1366, 181 Gal. Rptr. at 249. For example,
one Hurd guideline requires that "all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject
must be recorded," Hurd, 86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97, yet it seems farfetched to
believe
that a conscientious defense counsel would meekly agree that the prose-
cution had recorded every bit of relevant information conveyed to the
hypnotist prior to the session, or that the hypnotist had conveyed abso-
lutely none of that information to the subject either while extracting the
latter's prehypnotic version of the facts or while questioning him both
during and after hypnosis, or that every single contact between the hyp-
notist and the subject, no matter how innocuous, had been preserved on
videotape.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 40, 723 P.2d at 1366, 181 Gal. Rptr. at 255. See also Diamond, supra
note 31, at 339 (A "complete record of the hypnotic experience is never possible ...
[because] influences exerted both before and after the hypnotic session become inte-
grated into the hypnotic experience.").
228 Hurd, 86 NJ. at 539, 432 A.2d at 93.
229 Shirley, 31 Gal. 3d at 39 n.24, 723 P.2d at 1366 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255 n.24.
230 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 105-07 & 181-82 and accompanying text.
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hypnotically refreshed testimony in courts determined to preserve
its exclusion.
CONCLUSION
In Rock v. Arkansas the Supreme Court invalidated per se rules
that exclude hypnotically refreshed testimony of criminal defend-
ants. Rock expands the scope of a criminal defendant's right to tes-
tify on his own behalf. This expanded protection, however, exceeds
constitutional reuqirements and permits the introduction of virtu-
ally untestable evidence. The Court's holding also casts doubt on
the continued validity of the Frye test, thereby opening the door for
admission of evidence which no one can reliably assess in a particu-
lar case.
Until the scientific community endorses hypnosis as a reliable
method of enhancing recall, the states should have the power to for-
mulate their own criminal trial rules and procedures regarding the
use of hypnosis. The Constitution does not warrant the Supreme
Court's imposition of its own solution to "a novel and difficult ques-
tion." 23 2 The Rock majority deems per se exclusions of hypnotically
refreshed testimony to be "arbitrary," thereby forcing trial courts to
undertake a case-by-case approach. By doing so, it has denigrated a
court's determination of whether to admit hypnotically refreshed
testimony to mere speculation. Consequently, the trier of fact is
compelled to distinguish between legitimate hypnotically "re-
freshed" testimony and hypnotically "manufactured" testimony, a
task beyond the capability of even experts.
Andrew C. Callari
232 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
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